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1MAIZE PRICE CYCLES IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA
Introduction
Maize prices have been established by central government in most 
countries in the region since the 1930s. Maize is the most 
important staple crop and adequate supplies are essential to -food 
security. -The major concern in the region is with the 
instability o-f -food supplies rather than increased supplies 
since the agronomic . potential exists -for adequate Or surplus 
maize production in normal rain-fall years. This paper shows how 
the pricing system has exaggerated the inherently , variable maize 
supplies.
While a general trend towards providing more attractive -farm 
prices -for maize is apparent in East and Southern Africa, this is 
linked to policies which emphasize maize self-sufficiency rather 
than comparative advantage in' agricultural production. Most 
countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have adopted a policy of 
self-sufficiency in maize. Virtually all the maize grown is 3 
. rainfed 5 both total rainfall and its distribution within a season 
exhibit considerable variability which in turn, is reflected 
directly in variations in the aggregate levels of maize output in 
Zimbabwe.
,1.
Planning is'complicated by the fact that maize is a high-bulk, 
low-value commodity and the high bridging costs result in a wide 
gap between import and export parity.’ To avoid imports, maize 
pricing policy is strongly influenced by considerations of likely 
maize output in dry years. The prices necessary to ensure
sufficient supplies in dry years lead inevitably to large 
surpluses in good years. Such excess maize production requires 
either export of the surplus, or its storage. Both are costly, 
and typically exports are made at a loss. On the other hand, 
large scale maize imports put a heavy strain on many areas of 
the economy, absorbing considerable amounts of scarce and 
expensive transport and foreign exchange resources. Imports are 
usually the less preferred yellow varieties and provide 
embarrassing evidence of failure to achieve the political goal of 
self-sufficiency. <■
The following’ analysis draws on data from Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. Throughout, the assumption is that farmers 
respond to relative price changes in the short run wherever 
market opportunities exist. Gerrard found supply response to be 
positive in all four countries and that in most cases there was 
very little lag' in the adjustment response to price changes from 
year to’ year. Kinsey provides further support for this view 
using Malawi data. Where . the technology used requires very
little long-term investment, lagged response is less likely.
' 2
Kenya 1
Maize production in t.he earl'y 1960s declined as a result of low 
producer prices. A drought in 1965 led to -food shortages and 
imported yellow maize. The resultant Commission o-f Inquiry
recommeqded sharply increased producer prices, rainfall was 
favorable in 1966 and the increased local production. left the 
Government with unsaleable stocks of imported yellow maize.
Cereals, particularly maize, continued to be in surplus and in 
1968 the producer price was reduced; marketed output fell and 
imports were ' necessary in the early 1970s. Maize prices were 
raised significantly in the mid 1.970s in order to ensure that 
Kenya maintained maize reserves of 200 000 tonnes. World prices 
were low in 1977 and with the Board holding almost 360 000 
tonnes and a very large maize crop, restrictions on the free 
movement and direct purchase of maize from farmers were lifted. 
This meant that despite the high pre — p1 an ting prices promised by 
the Board, most-farmers received very low prices since they were 
unable to sell to the Board.^ It was assumed that Kenya would 
have a permanent surplus of maize. Although the official pre­
planting price for maize in 1978 was the same as that for 1977, 
both acreage and hybrid seed sales were down. Many of the small 
farmers had lost faith in the official marketing system and maize 
purchases in 1978 were low. With low world prices and high stock 
levels (despite poor deliveries in 1978) the 1979 pre-planting 
producer price was dropped.n 1 ‘
Maize stocks were exported in 1979 which (combined with a fall in 
the area planted to maize, a fall in the use of purchased inputs 
and poor growing conditions) resulted in imports in 1980. 
Producer prices for both wheat and maize were substantially 
raised in mid —1980, The estimation of future demand and sup’ply 
in the 1981 Sessional Paper ,on Food Policy indicated that Kenya 
would not achieve self-sufficiency in maize, wheat, rice, beans 
or milk until 1989 at the earliest. In fact by 1982 Kenya was 
self-sufficient and they have continued fluctuations in 1983 
throughout the 1980s.
Tanzania
Tanzania faced a serious ' drought in 1962 which affected maize' 
production and subsequent attitude to price policy and in the 
1960s food crops received prices which were more favourable than 
those for export.(Kriesel et al). In 1968 and 1969 maize was 
exported at substantial losses. There was Little or no increase 
in nominal prices for -most agricultural commodities between 
1969/70 and 1973/74 and real prices declined by up to 307. 
(Ellis) j The harvest failures'in 1974 and 1975 resulted in the
‘See Muir 1982 for a detailed description.of pricing and 
marketing
3necessity to import large quantities of, grain (447 000 tonnes and 
269- 000 tonnes) which coming just alter the 1973 oil' price rises 
resulted in a serious shortage o-f -foreign currency and a heavy 
burden to government expenditure. Lofchie (1976 and 1978) 
attributed the crisis predominantly to agricultural policy 
including price policy.
Although nominal producer prices increased after 1975 and the 
import requirement was reduced, inflation was so rapid that there 
was little real gain and Tanzania -faced heavy imports in 1980. 
The downward trend in production was accentuated by the 
deteriorating internal transport and marketing position, lack o-f 
inputs and the shortage o-f consumer. goods. Maize sales only grew 
in the southern region where they were encouraged by a transport 
subsidy. Real prices have been increased signi-ficantly since 
1984- which have resulted, together with good rains, in the 407. 
annual increase in o-f-ficial purchases (Amani et a 1 in Blackie and 
Muir).
Malawi
As with other countries, producer prices -for maize increase 
sharply after the need to import; declining in real terms 
thereafter until it once again becomes necessary to import. 
Imports in 1970 and again in 1975-76 and 1980-81 were preceded 
by declining real producer prices and -followed by significant 
increases in producer prices. Prices have particular ly -favoured 
maize since the crisis in 1980 as the government was determinated 
to increase emergency stocks and as a result peasant -farmers 
moved back towards maize monoculture. Malawi recovered -from its 
droughts and was exporting three -fi-fths o-f maize sales by 1984. 
The surpluses created a serious burden on the State marketing 
system and encouraged the current move towards privatisation o-f 
domestic marketing. However, declining real producer prices 
-since 1985, poor rains and increased demand -from Mozambique 
refugees resulted in major shortages in 1987 and 1988.
Zambia
High producer prices,at Independence in 1964 brought surpluses 
and- in 1967, the government reduced the price of maize whilst 
considerably increasing the consumer subsidy. The producer price 
was reduced again in 1968 to encourage the diversification away 
from maize into other crops and livestock. These lower producer 
prices and lower consumer prices resulted in the need to import 
maize in 1969. Producer prices were boosted but subsequently
declined and in the latter half of the 1970s production also 
declined. This resulted in the need for substantial imports in 
the early 1980s and producer prices were increased sharply. 
Thus once again, imports, although precipitated by a drought,' 
were made necessary by -dec lining real producer prices in the 
preceding years.
4n Maize price cycles ^
The state marketing boards in all -four countries operate a de 
jure or a de -facto monopoly on major grain purchases, sales and 
exports. Producer. prices are normally announced prior to
• planting in order to influence -farmers' planting decisions -for 
the coming growing season. - ■
All tour countries have followed a remarkably similar pattern of 
maize pricing. The pattern is for the maize producer price to 
rise sharply, in the year following a drought when maize imports 
were either necessary or likely to be needed. A surplus of
maize is produced in the next year of adequate rainfal 1 and 
thereafter .nominal maize prices remain virtually static. Maize 
prices thus decline both real terms and relative to'other
crops. This leads to a.steady downward trend in aggregate maize 
production, due to a decline in area planted, a decrease in the 
use of improved technologies^ or both. The size of the maize 
surplus consequent on the original drought-induced price rise 
conceals thfe effect of the declining production trend until 
drought occurs again and production falls steeply. Imports are 
once again necessary and the cycle is repeated.
A ' common feature of pricing in the official markets in-Eastern 
and Southern Africa is for the maize price to be fixed both
between cropping seasons and over the tpuntry as a whole. The 
constraints on private marketing, plus the absence of any' 
seasonal or regional maize price differentials, make the large- 
scale storage of maize grain a government responsibility;, there 
is little incentive for the private holding of grain stocks. The 
cost of acquiring, holding and distributing sufficient maize 
stocks to carry the more populous countries of Southern and 
Eastern African over consecutive droughts, are substantial(Muir 
and Takavarasha). Maize imports typically become necessary when 
a country has experienced two or more drought years in 
succession; those nations with low levels of official marketings 
ntay experience sufficient maize shortages for imports to be 
necessary even after a single year of drought.
The total maize harvest in all four countries relies heavily on a 
short rainy season, the parameters of which are highly variable 
both within and between,, seasons. . However, it will be shown in 
the following sections that in each case examined, a serious 
shortage of maize, although precipitated by a drought, has been 
the result of stagnating or dec 1 ininq "per capita production for 
several years before a drought year.. . The predominant cause for 
this fall in per capi ta maize production is identified as a 
result of stagnating or-declining producer prices.
■ t ; -^-especially cash demanding inputs such as hybrid seed and 
fer.ti lizer
5Combined Analysis of Maize Price Cycles: An Application of the
Cobweb Model
The cycle is the mirror-image of the classical textbook cobweb 
model and is shown graphically in Figure 1. The basic assumption 
in the cobweb model is th^t producers respond to last year's 
price and it is this lagged supply response which causes a 
cyclical relationship. In the countries studied, where prices 
are established by government, a lagged price resppnse causes the 
cycle. The basic assumptions in this model are:
1. The government bases its price on current stocks which 
are a -function of the previous(, year' s supply
2. Current supply is a function of rainfall and current 
price. Current price is a function of the previous' 
year's supply.
. Figure 1 /Cyclical Movement of Institutionally -Established
Prices and Marketed Output
In the first period declining real prices have resulted 
in low marketed output; •* Q. tr where grain has to be imported
In response. government increases pre_planting prices tor 
the following season to ?2
Farmers respond over the next few seasons by increasing 
output to Q2 which results in a surplus for export
For a number, of 
prices or the i 
with inflation so
years government does -not increase nominal 
n.creases are insufficient to keep pace 
that real producer prices decline to Pi
Farmers Despond by reducing production to Qi - 
. Imports are necessary and the cycle begins again.
6In Kenya (Figure 2) low producer prices in the early 1960s
resulted in imports -from 1964-66. Very high . producer prices in
1966 and 1967 resulted in export losses in 1968 and 1969; low
prices in 1968-70 resulted in imports in the early 1970s. high, 
nominal prices to -farmers throughout most o-f the 1970s 
maintained high marketed output and kept Kenya in a surplus 
position. But declining producer prices in 1978 and 1979
together with poor weather conditions resulted in the need -for 
very large imports o-f maize in the early 1980s.
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7in Malawi (Figure 3) imparts in 1970 and again in 1975-76 and 
1980-81 were preceded by declining real producer prices and 
followed by significant increases in producer prices.MALAWI
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In Zambia low producer prices from 
from 1969 tp 1972 and declining real 
resulted in imports from 1979-83.
1967-69 resulted in imports 
prices in 1977 and 1978
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8In Tanzania (Figure 5) the massive imports necessary in 1973-74 
•followed declining real ’ producer prices. Producer price
increase of 527. from 1973 to 1974 were given as a result o-f these 
large deficits, and by 197B there was a surplus -for export. 
However, declining real prices since 1978 resulted in large 
defic i ts.
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1980 heralded a crisis as all -four countries were -forced to 
import significant quantities of their major staple food, maize,. 
These imports were.not only, politically embarrassing; they also 
accentuated a difficult balaqce of payments position created by 
increased oil'prices and a slump, in the world demand for primary 
commodities, particularly copper, coffee and tobacco. All four 
countries took immediate steps to increase significant 1 y producer 
prices of maize. In all the countries, producers responded 
rapidly to the increas'es in real producer prices of maize.
9Further Evidsnce -From Zimbabwe
A similar pattern is also in evidence in 1 Zimbabwe 'since 
independence. When the new government came.into power in April 
1980, producer prices and the area planted to maize had been 
declining -for a number of years. For the -First time in several 
decades, Zimbabwe was -Faced with the need to import maize. • The 
government agreed to a pre-planting price of Z$120 (a 407.
increase over the previous year's official price). Farmers'
responded enthusiastica 1 1 y to the' price, the cessation- of the' war 
and the distribution of seedpacks to smallholder. Sales to -the 
official Grain Marketing Board (GMB) increased from 800,000 
tonnes in 1980 to 2 million tonnes in 1981. ■
Exports of the surplus .maize were at a loss. For the next three 
years,, despite poor rains, prices 1 remained static in nominal 
terms (falling 277. in real terms compared to 1980781). The area 
planted by large scale farmers fell 207.. -In reaction to low
maize stock levels and the maize imports, government announced a 
307, nominal increase in the pre—planting producer price for the 
1985/86 season. - Again, an embarrassing surplus - of maize
resulted.- In consequence, a two—tier maize price was introduced 
for 'the 1986/87 season which intended to provide an- incentive 
price to sma 1 1  ho 1 ders, while encouraging large-scale producers to 
switch td alternative crops. Drought in that- season resulted in 
a marked decrease in marketed maize production, but there were 
sufficient stocks on hand to avoid imports -andalTow1 limited 
regiona1 'maize exports.. ' '
Conclusion
The trend established in the 1960s and 1970s appears to.'be 
continuing in the 1980s as the countries continue to move between 
extreme deficit and surplus positions. Both importing and
exporting maize is usually uneconomic. In 1981 the Zimbabwe
export parity price was US$110 and the import parity US$245 
(Muir-Leresche) , 3
Government intervention in the market is aimed, amongst other 
objectives, at maize se1f-sufficiency .and stable prices. The 
evidence suggests, given the unreliable climate and the high 
costs of acquiring and holding stocks sufficient to carry the 
countries through several years of drought without imports, that 
the maize market in Southern and Eastern Africa is inherently 
unstable. It also appear.s that government intervention has 
exacerbated this situation. Currently efforts to encourage
African countries to decontrol agricultural markets is based on 
the assumption that a free market system for .maize would be less 
disruptive than the present system. The important role of
parastatals to welfare ' in areas with poorly developed
-'Where regional' 'trade- is feasible; the differentials could 
he greatly reduced. ; .
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infrastructure is often unrecognised. It is likely, therefore, 
that governments wil-l resist decontrol, and that some other means 
of reducing the destjabi 1 ising effects of the current' pricing 
systems must be -found.
A partially decontrolled market would provide a possible 
alternative and readers are referred to Child, Muir and Blackie 
for details of one such a system. Where even partial decontrol 
is . not feasible, an 'independent basis for establishing prices 
would reduce the influence of the previous year's import position 
when setting the official current year's price. It would also 
reduce the impact of both consumer and producer- lobbies, leading 
, to a more efficient allocation of resources. Governments would 
still exercise control1 but would be more fully aware of both the 
distributional and ..efficiency costs of such policy. Muir
suggests a system based on' ai moving average of US Gulf Port 
prices (Muir-Leresche, 1984). .
Underlying both these analyses is the, assumption that controlled 
marketing answers a real political <ahd economic need in sub- 
Saharan Africa. The uncertainty of food production, and the
difficulties of trade in the region, are such that governments 
are unlikely to gamble 6 h private trading to supply the market 
for major staples. Governments of such different political
persuasions as South Africa and Tanzania rely extensively on 
public sector involvement in maize marketing. Gsaenger and
Schmidt, have shown that, with low.income and price elasticities 
of demand for maize, consumer welfare (particu1 ar 1 y for low 
income groups) will fluctuate Widely under free market
conditions; an undesirable and politically destabilising 
condition. Their analysis of the welfare effects of various
stabilisation schemes indicates that price stabilisation has net 
positive welfare implications where fluctuations are due to 
random shifts in supply. This is the case particularly in
Eastern and Southern Africa, where total maize production is 
highly influenced by annual variation in rainfall.
Either partial decontrol or an independent price formulae leave 
the. management of national maize food security firmly with the 
official agency.. The maintenance of a. strategic reserve or the 
importation of maize to cover supply, shortfalls are policy 
options available to cover periods of insufficient maize 
production. An official marketing agency d.s well suited to 
undertake both these functions in the African context where there 
is heavy state control of foreign exchange allocations to both 
public and private sectors. The maintenance of strategic reserve 
is not attractive to the private sector under current price and 
investment environments in the region. Empirical evidence from 
Tanzania shows while free market conditions were able to equate 
internal supply and demand in normal . seasons, this was not true 
in periods of severe drought when major deficits occur (Kriesel 
e t a 1 ) . Similarly, the import and export of grain can remain 
under public management, particularly in countries were the 
private sector has not experienced the competitive environment of
11
internationa1 grain . trade. A well run maize board should be 
in-formed on both national supply conditions and on government 
foreign currency. allocation priorities and , availabi 1 ity. 
Particularly in the landlocked countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
trade in bulk commodities is slow, difficult, and expensive. On 
the other hand, the preceding evidence has. shown that the 
maintenance'of buffer stocks sufficient to stabilise supplies is 
beyond the budgets of most official maize agencies.
The partial decontrol approach brings maize marketing and pricing 
out of the either/or debate of privatisation. . The issue is one 
of trade-offs between the size and cost of publicly owned stocks, 
and the volume and price of periodic imports. It allows African 
governments, through their official 1 marketing boards, to retain 
an- important influence bn the overall trade in maize; The 
particular emphasis in national policy . moves to one of 
maintaining sufficient national maize- supplies. The private 
sector takes on an expanded role., in local and regional maize 
grain trade. > Thus, pub 1ic ■ bontro1 over maize stocks is 
maintained while the high costs, inefficiencies and general 
exploitation of both producers ahd consumers, which has come to 
be associated with African parastatal maize boards, is avoided.
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